

15 May 1974

TO: Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, USN
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency

Vince:

I hope the attached squares the circle protecting your legitimate equities and at the same time making our service colleagues feel wanted to the point that they will participate willingly. I would appreciate your seeing that word gets to the services through your good offices as promptly as possible since 22 May is only five working days away and those participating in the 22 May seance may want to do some thinking and homework before arriving at the meeting.

Many thanks.



George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505


15 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, USN
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Need for Service Participation in the
Development of a Proposed National
Intelligence Production Schedule on
Strategic Programs

1. As I mentioned in our 14 May conversation, on 10 May Mr. Howard Stoertz (the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs) distributed to various intelligence research managers a memorandum, with attachments, outlining a meeting Mr. Stoertz wants to convene on 22 May. The purpose of this meeting is to review the bidding on projects that ought to be considered for the second half of this calendar year. Since the group involved is a working level one analogous to a group of USIB representatives, Mr. Stoertz' memorandum was sent to various officials in DIA, CIA, State, NSA and AEC and was not sent to the USIB principals.

2. For reasons which we discussed, Mr. Stoertz believes (and I agree) that the community's total address to the range of problems involved would be greatly facilitated if this meeting could also be attended by appropriate working level managers in the three service intelligence components. I have therefore appended three additional copies of Mr. Stoertz' 10 May memorandum (plus an additional one for your personal records) and request that you distribute them to General Aaron, Admiral Rectanus and General Keegan. We want to be punctilious about the channels through which formal communications are sent to the service intelligence components but at the same time, we all have a common interest in getting done expeditiously that which needs to be done -- something which, of course, involves the direct participation of all who will be doing the actual work.


George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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Atts: A/S

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Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

SP - 55/74
10 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
United States Air Force

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs, July-December 1974

1. As you recall, you received through USIB channels in February a memorandum concerning planned interagency intelligence production on foreign strategic matters through July 1974. The participation of the military services has contributed greatly to the preparation of several of the studies called for in that production program.

2. Although a number of projects scheduled earlier in the year are still underway, it is not too early to begin thinking about our national intelligence production program for the second half of the year, especially inasmuch as individual agencies are already preparing their work programs for the next fiscal year. Moreover, the question of the major year-end estimates on strategic forces needs to be resolved.

3. I am requesting that senior research managers from Intelligence community agencies meet to consider a production program for July-December 1974, and invite you to designate a representative to participate. An agenda for the meeting is attached as well as two papers you may wish to study prior to the meeting. Progress reports on various aspects of NIO/SP activity will be handed out at the meeting.

4. I plan to hold this meeting on 22 May from 1000 to 1200 in Room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters.



Howard Stoertz, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

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Attachments:
Three as stated

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SP - 55/74

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs, July-December 1974

Distribution:

- 1 - Army Addressee
- 1 - Navy Addressee
- 1 - Air Force Addressee
- 1 - D/DCI/NIO
- 1 - NIO/RI
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NIO/SP:RGates:mat/ (10May74)

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Attachment 1 to:
SP - 55/74

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR NIO/SP PLANNING MEETING

- I. Report by NIO/SP on status of current work program and ad hoc projects. (Hand out at meeting)
- II. Report by NIO/SP on projections issue and solution. (Hand out at meeting)
- III. Discussion of proposal to prepare consolidated survey of Soviet Strategic Forces in 1974. (Attachment)
- IV. Discussion of proposed work program for period July-December 1974. (Attachment)
- V. Other Business

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Attachment 2 to:
9-155774

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
ON SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES:
A COMBINED APPROACH FOR 1974

1. In considering national intelligence production related to strategic programs during 1974, the NIO has attempted to encourage improved responsiveness to the needs of the policymaker and flexibility in various publications to allow for changing circumstances. A combination of circumstances suggests that the interests of Intelligence as well as those of the policymaker would be best served this year by combining the NIEs on Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces into one document comprising a survey of Soviet strategic forces.

2. There are several factors which commend this approach this year in particular:

- both NIE 11-3 and NIE 11-8 must be done this year; the last NIE 11-3 was done in 1972, and a Memorandum to Holders was prepared in 1973;
- in recent months, policymakers have emphasized the need for brevity in strategic estimates; integration would help to meet that need;
- recently, PFIAB was critical of certain key judgments in NIE 11-8; their criticism would have been mitigated and perhaps avoided had strategic offensive and defensive aspects of the threat been integrated into one estimate and that integration reflected in the key judgments.

3. Other factors not peculiar to this year also support an integrated approach:

- treatment of offensive and defensive forces in the same document would assure that new developments and forecasts in either field would be taken into account in analyzing the other and could produce improvements in analyses of current strategic forces as well as future force structures and threats;
- a single document surveying Soviet strategic forces could enhance the value of the estimate to the policymaker, who would then have readily available a concise but comprehensive assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions;

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--integration could provide some economies in time, paperwork, personnel and length of document at least sufficient to diminish somewhat the "annual agony."

4. Such a survey of Soviet strategic capabilities needs to take into account policy relevant topics and expressions of particular interest made known in recent months, and to focus especially on areas of uncertainty in earlier versions of NIE 11-8 and NIE 11-3. In addition, the changing US nuclear strategy as expressed in NSDM 242 has given new significance to some aspects of the threat, for example, Soviet nuclear war fighting capabilities--both what that means and Soviet doctrine pertinent to it--as well as Soviet attack assessment capabilities and capabilities for strategic warning. On the other hand, the survey should not broadly expand the scope of either NIE 11-8-73 or NIE 11-3-72, for example, to include Soviet capabilities for peripheral attack.

5. As noted above, policymakers have stated quite firmly their preference for brief, policy relevant estimates on strategic forces. Therefore, a strategic survey or estimate this year should be held to 20-30 pages if possible. For example, particular emphasis can be placed on brevity in the description of what is already known about Soviet strategic forces. Supporting analysis should be published separately as annexes to the Estimate. The supporting analysis in 1974 should take into account the findings of current interagency research on the following specific topics of previous uncertainty and/or disagreement:

--ICBM and SLBM accuracies;

--capabilities and employment of Backfire;

--Soviet laser research, particularly as it relates to strategic defense applications;

--Soviet capabilities for detection and localization of submarines in open ocean areas.

6. As with any new approach to a problem, organizational difficulties can be expected. Nevertheless, the objective would be to keep the entire process as simple and straightforward as possible. Descriptive sections on offensive and defensive forces can be treated separately in the survey and can be prepared as in the past. The principal work of integration should be in the Key Judgments section and the Force Implications section, both based upon the other sections of the paper.

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SP - 55/74

PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ON FOREIGN STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, JULY-DECEMBER 1974

1. In considering a work program for the period July-December 1974, we have taken into account our experience during the past several months. The initial NIO/SP production program of self-initiated projects proved somewhat ambitious in that it failed to anticipate the large number of unscheduled requests for studies by various policymakers. Further, the projects are taking somewhat longer than we had anticipated in the initial schedule. Thus, the number of projects we suggest for the second half of this year is limited. In the same manner that we jointly prepared the work program last winter, we welcome your suggestions for the project list. We again plan to touch base with various policymakers to keep ourselves aware of their current or anticipated needs and to elicit their suggestions on the proposed program.

2. We propose the following projects:

a. President's Quarterly Report on Developments in Soviet Strategic Forces

Type: Interagency Intelligence Report

Target Dates: 1 October and 1 January

Primary Responsibility: CIA/OSR

Principal Collaborating Agencies: DIA, NSA, State

b. SALT Monitoring Report

Type: USIB SALT Steering Group Report

Target Date: September (?)

Primary Responsibility: CIA/OSR

Principal Collaborating Agencies: DIA, State

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c. Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict
(see accompanying memorandum)

Type: National Intelligence Estimate

Target Date: November 1974

Primary Responsibility: CIA/OSR

Principal Collaborating Agencies: CIA, DIA, State, NSA, Army,
Navy, Air Force, AEC

d. Soviet Development and Deployment of Land-Based Mobile
Strategic Missiles

Type: Interagency Intelligence Report

Target Date: September 1974

Primary Responsibility: DIA/DE

Principal Collaborating Agencies: CIA, State, NSA, Army, Air Force

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